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Chapter 2. Miscellaneous

Table of Contents

2.1. Emergency descent (memory item)
2.2. Windshear (memory item)
2.3. Unreliable airspeed (memory item)
2.4. Incapacitation
2.5. Ditching
2.6. Forced landing
2.7. Evacuation
2.8. Overweight landing
2.9. Engine failure in cruise
2.10. Single engine circling
2.11. Bomb on board
2.12. Stall recovery (memory item)
2.13. Computer reset
2.14. Landing distance calculations
2.15. Abnormal V Alpha Prot
2.16. Overspeed Recovery
2.17. Volcanic Ash Encounter

2.1. Emergency descent (memory item)

If an emergency descent is required, the Captain should consider taking control if not already PF. PF initiates the memory items by announcing “Emergency Descent.”

Don oxygen masks and establish communication.

PF then flies the emergency descent. Descent with autopilot and autothrust engaged is preferred. The configuration is thrust idle, full speed brake and maximum appropriate speed, taking into account possible structural damage.[5] Target altitude is FL100 or MORA if this is higher. If speed is low, allow speed to increase before deploying full speedbrake to prevent activation of the angle of attack protection. Landing gear may be used below 25,000ft, but speed must be below VLO when it is extended and remain below VLE. If on an airway, consider turning 90° to the left.

PM’s only memory action is to turn the seatbelt signs on.[6] Initially, PM’s main task is to ensure that PF has promptly and correctly initiated the descent.

Once the memory actions are complete and the aircraft is descending, PF should call for the Emergency Descent Checklist (“My radios, Emergency Descent Checklist”). This will lead PF to finesse the speed and altitude targets and inform ATC of the descent; PM to set continuous ignition on the engines and set 7700 on the transponder. Both pilots then set their oxygen flows to the N position[7] and, if cabin altitude will exceed 14,000ft, PM deploys the cabin oxygen masks. On easyJet aircraft, the CIDS/PRAM will automatically play a suitable PA, so it is not necessary for the flight crew to carry out the EMER DESCENT (PA) action.

Once level, restore the aircraft to a normal configuration. When safe to do so, advise cabin crew and passengers that it is safe to remove their masks. To deactivate the mask microphone and switch off the oxygen flow, close the oxygen mask stowage compartment and press the “PRESS TO RESET” oxygen control slide.

[EOMB 3.80.2, QRH AEP.MISC, FCOM AEP.MISC, FCTM AEP.MISC]

2.2. Windshear (memory item)

2.2.1. Reactive

The windshear detection system is a function of the Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC). It only operates during the takeoff and landing phases with at least CONF 1 selected. In the takeoff phase, warnings are provided from 3 seconds after lift off until 1300ft RA is achieved. In the landing phase warnings are provided between 1300ft RA and 50ft RA. A warning is indicated by a red “WINDSHEAR” flag on the PFD and a “WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR” aural warning.

When on the ground, windshear is only indicated by significant airspeed variations. It is possible that these fluctuations may cause V1 to occur significantly later in the takeoff run then it should. It therefore falls to the Captain to make an assessment of whether sufficient runway remains to reject the takeoff, or whether getting airborne below Vr would be the better option. If the takeoff is to be continued in windshear conditions, call “Windshear, TOGA” and apply TOGA power. Rotate at Vr or with sufficient runway remaining and follow SRS orders.[8] SRS will maintain a minimum rate of climb, even if airspeed must be sacrificed.

If a warning occurs when airborne, call “Windshear, TOGA”, apply TOGA power and maintain current configuration. The autopilot can fly the escape manoeuvre as long as αreq < αprot. If the autopilot is not engaged, follow the SRS orders on the FD. If the FD is not available, initially pitch up to 17.5°, then increase as required.

Do not change configuration until out of the windshear.

In severe windshear, it is possible that ALPHA FLOOR protection will activate. As TOGA will already be selected, this will have no immediate effect. Once clear of the windshear, however, TOGA LK will be active, requiring the autothrust to be disconnected to avoid an overspeed. This is most naturally achieved by pressing the “instinctive disconnect pb” on the thrust levers then flying manual thrust until the situation has sufficiently stabilised to re-engage the autothrust.

[FCOM PRO.AEP.SURV]

2.2.2. Predictive

When below 2300ft AGL, the weather radar scans a 5nm radius 60° arc ahead of the aircraft for returns indicating potential windshear.

Alerts are categorised as advisory, caution or warning, in increasing order of severity. Severity is determined by range, position and phase of flight. Alerts are only provided when between 50ft and 1500ft, or on the ground when below 100kt.

All types of alert produce an indication of windshear position on the ND, providing the ND range is set to 10nm. A message on the ND instructs the crew to change range to 10nm if not already set. Cautions also give an amber “W/S AHEAD” message on both PFDs and an aural “MONITOR RADAR DISPLAY” warning. Warnings give a red “W/S AHEAD” message on the PFDs and either a “WINDSHEAR AHEAD, WINDSHEAR AHEAD” or “GO AROUND, WINDSHEAR AHEAD” aural message.

If a warning alert occurs during the takeoff roll, reject the takeoff. If it occurs during initial climb, call “Windshear, TOGA”, apply TOGA thrust and follow SRS orders. Configuration may be changed as long as the windshear is not entered.

If a warning alert occurs during approach, carry out a normal go-around. If positive verification is made that no hazard exists, providing that the reactive windshear is serviceable the crew may downgrade the warning to a caution. If a caution alert occurs during approach, consider use of CONF 3 and increasing VAPP to a maximum of VLS+15.

[FCOM PRO.AES.SURV]

2.3. Unreliable airspeed (memory item)

Unreliable airspeed indications may result from radome damage and/or unserviceable probes or ports. Altitude indications may also be erroneous if static probes are affected.

The FMGCs normally reject erroneous ADR data by isolating a single source that has significant differences to the other two sources. It is possible that a single remaining good source may be rejected if the other two sources are erroneous in a sufficiently similar way. In this case, it falls to the pilots to identify and turn off the erroneous sources to recover good data.

The first problem is recognition of a failure, since the aircraft systems may be unable to warn of a problem. The primary method of doing this is correlation of aircraft attitude and thrust to displayed performance. Correlation of radio altimeter and GPIRS derived data (available on GPS MONITOR page) may also aid identification. The stall warning (available in alternate or direct law) is based on alpha probes, so will likely be valid. Other clues may include fluctuations in readings, abnormal behaviour of the automatics, high speed buffet or low aerodynamic noise.

If the aircraft flight path is in doubt, disconnect the automatics and fly the following short term attitude and thrust settings to initiate a climb:

ConditionThrustPitch
Below Thrust Reduction AltitudeTOGA15°
Below FL100Climb10°
Above FL100Climb

If configured CONF Full, select CONF 3, otherwise flap/slat configuration should be maintained. The gear and speedbrake should be retracted. If there is any doubt over the validity of altitude information, the FPV must be disregarded. If altitude information is definitely good, the FPV may be used.

It is important to understand that at this stage, while the pilot has identified that airspeed is unreliable, the aircraft systems have not. Thus flight envelope protections based on airspeed data from unreliable ADRs may activate. This may lead to pitch inputs from the flight computers that cannot be overridden with the sidesticks. In this case, immediately switch off any two ADRs; this causes the flight computers to revert to Alternate Law with no protections, and thus allows control of the aircraft to be regained.

Once the flight path is under control and a safe altitude is attained, the aircraft should be transitioned into level flight. Refer to QRH AEP.NAV.USI to extract a ballpark thrust setting, a reference attitude and a reference speed for the current configuration, bearing in mind that an auto-retraction of the flap may have occurred. Set the ballpark thrust setting and adjust pitch attitude to fly level; if barometric altitude data is considered accurate use the VSI, otherwise fly a constant GPS altitude. The thrust should then be adjusted until level flight is achieved with the reference attitude. Note that in the radome damage case, the required N1 may be as much as 5% greater than the ballpark figure. Once stable, the speed will be equal to the reference speed.

If there is insufficient data available to fly level (e.g. GPS data unavailable and barometric data unreliable), fly the reference attitude with the ballpark thrust setting. This will give approximately level flight at approximately reference speed.

With the speed now known, the ADRs can be checked to see if any are giving accurate data. If at least one ADR is reliable, turn off the faulty ADRs. GPS and IRS ground speeds may also be used for an approximate cross check.

If all ADRs are considered unreliable, turn off any two of them; one is kept on to provide stall warning from the alpha probes. More recent aircraft have backup speed/altitude scales based on AOA probes and GPS altitudes which are activated when below FL250 by turning off the third ADR. The ALL ADR OFF procedure in QRH AEP.NAV describes the use of these scales, but it boils down to fly the green on the speed scale and anticipate slightly reduced accuracy from the altitude scale. For aircraft without this functionality, tables are provided in section AEP.NAV.USI of the QRH to enable all phases of flight to be flown using just pitch and thrust settings. Acceleration and clean up are carried out in level flight. Flap 1 can be selected as soon as climb thrust is selected, flap 0 once the appropriate S speed pitch attitude from the table on the first page of the QRH AEP.NAV.USI procedure is reached. Configuration for approach is also carried out in level flight, stabilising in each configuration using the technique described above. The approach is flown in CONF 3 at an attitude that should result in VLS+10 when flying a 3° glide. Landing distance will be increased.

[QRH AEP.NAV, FCOM PRO.AEP.NAV, FCTM PRO.AEP.NAV]

2.4. Incapacitation

Take control, using the stick priority button if necessary. Contact cabin crew ASAP. They should strap the incapacitated pilot to his seat, move the seat back, then recline it. If there are two cabin crew available, the body can be moved. Medical help should be sought from passengers, and the presence of any type rated company pilots on board ascertained.

[FCTM PRO.AEP.MISC]

2.5. Ditching

If time is short due to loss of thrust at low altitude, a “quick” ditching procedure is available on the back of the normal checklist. This procedure gives you a suitable configuration for ditching (CONF 2, Gear up) and a table for determining a suitable approach speed given your gross weight. It also instructs that the APU be started, the ditching button be pushed, provides guidance for the flare (minimise VS, attitude 11°) and provides instructions for shutting down the engines and APU on touchdown (all masters off).

If time is available, apply the procedures in the QRH. The QRH AEP.MISC Ditching procedure applies if the engines are running. If the engines are not running, depending on airframe, refer to either the appropriate QRH AEP.ENG ENG DUAL FAILURE (DEF) procedure or to the QRH AEP.ENG ALL ENG FAIL (AEF) procedure[9]; all of these incorporate ditching procedures.

Preparation for ditching involves notifying ATC in order to expedite rescue, preparing survival equipment and securing the aircraft for impact. The GPWS should be inhibited to prevent nuisance warnings. The crew oxygen should be turned off below FL100 to prevent potentially dangerous leaks.[10]

The engines operative ditching configuration is gear up, config full, 11° pitch and minimal V/S. If both engines are inoperative: for DEF airframes use config 3 and for AEF airframes use config 2[11]; maintain at least 150kt to give a margin against RAT stall. In strong winds, land into wind. In lighter winds, land parallel to swell. At 2000ft AGL, the bleeds are all turned off, the ditching button is pushed[12] and the “Cabin crew, landing positions” PA is made. At 500ft, make a PA “Brace, brace”

At touchdown, turn the engine and APU masters off. After coming to a stop, notify ATC, push all fire buttons, discharge all agents (engine agent 2 may not be available) and evacuate the aircraft.[13]

[QRH AEP.MISC, QRH AEP.ENG, FCOM PRO.AEP.ENG]

2.6. Forced landing

If time is short due to loss of thrust at low altitude, a “quick” forced landing procedure is available on the back of the normal checklist. This procedure gives you a suitable configuration for forced landing (CONF 2, Gear down by gravity, spoilers armed) and a table for determining a suitable approach speed given your gross weight. It also instructs that the APU be started, provides guidance for the flare (minimise VS) and provides instructions for shutting down the engines and APU on touchdown (all masters off).

If time is available, apply the procedures in the QRH. The QRH AEP.MISC Forced Landing procedure applies if the engines are running. If the engines are not running, depending on airframe, refer to either the appropriate QRH AEP.ENG ENG DUAL FAILURE (DEF) procedure or to the QRH AEP.ENG ALL ENG FAIL (AEF) procedure[9]; all of these incorporate Forced Landing procedures.

Preparation for forced landing involves notifying ATC in order to expedite rescue, preparing survival equipment and securing the aircraft for impact. The GPWS should be inhibited to prevent nuisance warnings. The crew oxygen should be turned off below FL100 to prevent potentially dangerous leaks.[10]

The engines operative forced landing configuration is gear down, config full, spoilers armed. If both engines are inoperative: for DEF airframes use config 3 and for AEF airframes use config 2[11]; maintain at least 150kt to give a margin against RAT stall. The ram air button is used to ensure that the aircraft will be completely depressurised at touchdown. At 2000ft, make a PA “Cabin crew, landing positions”. At 500ft, make a PA “Brace, brace”

At touchdown, turn the engine and APU masters off. This will leave accumulator braking only. After coming to a stop, set the parking brake, notify ATC, push all fire buttons, discharge all agents (engine agent 2 may not be available) and evacuate the aircraft.[13]

[QRH AEP.MISC, QRH AEP.ENG, FCOM PRO.AEP.ENG]

2.7. Evacuation

Evacuation should be carried out in accordance with the emergency evacuation checklist. The easyJet procedure is for CM1 to call for the checklist and then send a Mayday message to ATC before commencing the checklist.

The first two items confirm the RTO actions of stopping the aircraft, setting the parking brake and alerting the cabin crew. The next item confirms ATC has been alerted.

The next four items prepare the aircraft for evacuation. If manual cabin pressure has been used, CM2 checks cabin diff is zero, and if necessary manually opens the outflow valve. CM2 then shuts the engines down with their master switches, and pushes all the fire buttons (including the APU). Confirmation is not required before carrying out these actions.[14] In response to the next checklist item, “Agents”, CM1 decides if any extinguishing agents should be discharged and instructs CM2 to discharge them as required. Engine agent 2 will not be available. Agents should only be discharged if there are positive signs of fire.

Finally, order the evacuation. This is primarily done with the PA “Evacuate, unfasten your seat belts and get out”, with the evacuation alarm being triggered as a backup.

[EOMB 3.80.1, FCOM PRO.AER.MISC, FCTM PRO.AER.MISC]

2.8. Overweight landing

A landing can be made at any weight, providing sufficient landing distance is available. In general, automatic landings are only certified up to MLW, but the FCOM specifies that, for the A319 only, autoland is available up to 69000kg in case of emergency. The preferred landing configuration is CONF FULL, but lower settings may be used if required by QRH/ECAM procedures. QRH AER.MISC.OL also specifies CONF 3 if the aircraft weight exceeds the CONF 3 go around limit; this will only ever be a factor for airfields with elevations above 1000ft. Packs should be turned off to provide additional go around thrust. If planned landing configuration is less than FULL, use 1+F for go-around.

It is possible that S speed will be higher than VFE next for CONF 2. In this case, a speed below VFE next should be selected until CONF 2 is achieved, then managed speed can be re-engaged.

In the final stages of the approach, reduce speed to achieve VLS at runway threshold. Land as smoothly as possible, and apply max reverse as soon as the main gear touches down. Maximum braking can be used after nosewheel touchdown. After landing, switch on the brake fans and monitor brake temperatures carefully. If temperatures exceed 800°C, tyre deflation may occur.

[QRH AER.MISC, FCOM PRO.AER.MISC, FCTM PRO.AER.MISC]

2.9. Engine failure in cruise

Engine out ceiling is highly dependent on weight; ISA deviation also has a modest effect. It will generally lie between FL180 and FL350.

The first action will be to select both thrust levers to MCT so as to allow the autothrust its full engine out range. If the N1 gauges indicate a thrust margin exists, then the aircraft is below engine out ceiling; descent may be appropriate to increase the available thrust margin, but there is no immediate threat. If, however, the N1 gauges indicate that the autothrust is commanding MCT, and the speed is still decaying, then the aircraft is above engine out ceiling and prompt execution of a drift down procedure is required.

Drift down with autopilot engaged in OP DES is preferred. Engagement of this vertical mode normally results in the autothrust commanding idle thrust, which is not what is desired. Thus, having set the thrust lever to MCT, the autothrust is disconnected. The PROG page provides a REC MAX EO flight level to use as an altitude target. If the speed decay is modest, it may be possible to alert ATC before initiating the descent, but in-service events have shown that speed decay is often very rapid, requiring descent initiation to be prioritised.

Once drift down has been initiated, a decision needs to be made about speed. If obstacles are a concern, the lowest drift down rate and highest ceiling are achieved at green dot. Airbus refers to drifting down at green dot as “Obstacle strategy”. Flying at green dot reduces the chance of the FADECs automatically relighting the failed engine as the engine will be windmilling more slowly. Therefore, if obstacles are not a concern, M.78/300kt is flown, a speed that will always fall within the stabilized windmill engine relight envelope; Airbus refers to this as “Standard Strategy”.

If obstacles remain a problem, MCT and green dot speed can be maintained to give a shallow climbing profile. Once obstacles are no longer a problem, descend to LRC ceiling (use V/S if <500 fpm descent rate), engage the autothrust and continue at LRC speed.

[FCTM PRO.AEP.ENG.EFDC]

2.10. Single engine circling

It may not be possible to fly level in the standard circling configuration of CONF 3 gear down. This can be ascertained by checking the table in QRH AEP.MISC One Engine Inoperative – Circling Approach. If affected, plan a FLAP 3 landing and delay gear extension until level flight is no longer required; a L/G NOT DOWN warning which will occur if circling below 750ft (can be silenced with the EMER CANC pb) and a TOO LOW GEAR should be anticipated if below 500ft RA.

[QRH AEP.MISC]

2.11. Bomb on board

The primary aim is to get the aircraft on the ground and evacuated ASAP.

The secondary aim is to prevent detonation of the device. This is achieved by preventing further increases in cabin altitude through the use of manual pressure control and by avoiding sharp manoeuvres and turbulence.

The tertiary aim is to minimise the effect of any explosion. This is achieved by reducing the diff to 1 psi. The method is to set cabin vertical speed to zero using manual pressurisation control, then descend to an altitude 2500ft above cabin altitude. As further descent is required, cabin vertical speed should be adjusted to maintain the 1 psi diff for as long as possible. Automatic pressure control is then reinstated on approach. Low speeds reduce the damage from an explosion but increase the risk of a timed explosion occurring whilst airborne; a compromise needs to be found. The aircraft should be configured for landing as early as possible to avoid an explosion damaging landing systems.

In the cabin, procedures are laid down for assessing the risks of moving the device and for moving the device to the LRBL at door 2R.

[QRH AER.80, FCOM PRO.AER.MISC]

2.12. Stall recovery (memory item)

Aerofoil stall is always and only an angle of attack issue. It is not possible to directly prove an unstalled condition from attitude and airspeed data. The flight recorders from the December 2014 Air Asia accident recorded an angle of attack of 40 degrees (i.e. around 25 degrees greater than critical angle) with both pitch and roll zero and speeds up to 160kt. Importantly, it is perfectly possible to be fully stalled in the emergency configurations described in Section 2.3, “Unreliable airspeed (memory item). Identification of a fully stalled condition is thus largely dependent on identifying a high and uncontrollable descent rate that does not correlate with normal flight path expectations for the attitude and thrust applied.

To recover from a fully stalled condition, the angle of attack of the aerofoils must be reduced to below critical. The generic stall recovery is therefore simply to pitch the nose down sufficiently to break the stall and level the wings. In normal operations, the velocity vector of the aircraft is around 3° below the centerline of the aircraft (i.e. an attitude of around 3° is required to fly level). In a stalled condition, the velocity vector may be 40° or more below the centerline of the aircraft. Thus the amount of pitch down required to recover a fully stalled aircraft can be 30° or more.

The aircraft’s thrust vector helps to accelerate the aircraft during the recovery, and increasing speed along the aircraft’s centerline acts to reduce the stalled angle of attack. Thus, while thrust is not a primary means of recovery, it does help. Unfortunately, Airbus have determined that due to the pitch couple associated with underslung engines, there may be insufficient longitudinal control authority to pitch the aircraft sufficiently to recover from a stall if TOGA is selected. It may therefore be necessary to initially reduce thrust to allow the primary recovery technique to be applied; this is extremely counterintuitive.

In the two recent Airbus accidents involving stalls, the lack of physical cross coupling of sidesticks was a major factor. If one pilot elects to hold full back sidestick, the aircraft cannot be recovered by the other pilot unless the takeover pushbutton is used. With all the alarms, it is easy to miss “Dual Input”.

Once there are no longer any indications of the stall, smoothly recover from the dive, adjust thrust, check speedbrakes retracted and if appropriate (clean and below 20,000ft) deploy the slats by selecting flaps 1. The load factor associated with an overly aggressive pull out can induce a secondary stall; on the flip side, once reattachment of the airflow occurs, drag rapidly diminishes and exceedance of high speed airframe limitations becomes a threat.

If a stall warner sounds on takeoff it is likely to be spurious since you are almost certainly in normal law. The procedure in this case is essentially to initially assume unreliable airspeed and fly TOGA, 15°, wings level until it can be confirmed that the warning is spurious.

A stall warning may occur at high altitude to indicate that the aircraft is reaching αbuffet. In this case simply reduce the back pressure on the sidestick and/or reduce bank angle.

[FCOM PRO.AER.MISC]

2.13. Computer reset

Abnormal computer behaviour can often be stopped by interrupting the power supply of the affected computer. This can be done either with cockpit controls or with circuit breakers. The general procedure is to interrupt the power supply, wait 3 seconds (5 seconds if a C/B was used), restore the power, then wait another three seconds for the reset to complete. QRH AER.SYSTEM RESET details the specific procedures for a variety of systems.

On the ground, almost all computers can be reset. MOC can usually supply a reset procedure if nothing applicable is available in the QRH. The exceptions are the ECU and EIU while the associated engine is running and the BSCU when the aircraft is not stopped.

In flight, only the computers listed in the QRH should be considered for reset.

[QRH AER.SYSTEM RESET]

2.14. Landing distance calculations

Many failures result in a longer than normal landing distance. The QRH inflight performance section has tables for calculating VAPP and Reference Landing Distances for single failures. These reflect the performance achievable in a typical operational landing without margin. easyJet requires a factor of 1.15 to be applied to these distances.

The EFB module provides both factored and unfactored landing distances, and also can calculate for multiple failures.

The safety factor may be disregarded in exceptional circumstances.

[QRH IFP, FCOM PER.LDG, EOMB 4.14.2]

2.15. Abnormal V Alpha Prot

If two or more angle of attack vanes become blocked at the same angle during climb, alpha floor protection will be activated once a Mach number is reached where the angle of attack at which the vanes were blocked becomes indicative of an incipient stall condition. Since the flight computer’s attempts to reduce angle of attack will not be registered by the blocked vanes, a continuous nose down pitch rate which cannot be stopped with sidestick inputs will result.

Indications of the incipient condition are available from the Alpha Prot and Alpha max strips. If the Alpha Max strip (solid red) completely hides the Alpha Prot strip (black and amber) or the Alpha Prot strip moves rapidly by more than 30kt during flight manoeuvres with AP on and speed brakes retracted, blocked angle of attack vanes should be suspected.

The solution is to force the flight computers into Alternate Law where the protection does not apply. This is most conveniently done by turning off any two ADRs. Once in Alternate Law, the stall warning strip (red and black) becomes available. Since this may be receiving data from a blocked angle of attack vane, erroneous presentation is possible.

[OEBPROC-48]

2.16. Overspeed Recovery

In general the response to an overspeed should be to deploy the speedbrake and monitor the thrust reduction actioned by the autothrust. Disconnection of the autopilot will not normally be required. If autothrust is not in use, the thrust levers will need to be manually retarded.

It is possible that the autopilot will automatically disengage and high speed protection will activate, resulting in an automatic pitch up. In this case, smoothly adjust pitch attitude as required.

[FCTM PRO.AER.MISC]

2.17. Volcanic Ash Encounter

Volcanic ash clouds are usually extensive, so the quickest exit will be achieved by a 180° turn.

Air quality may be affected, so crew oxygen masks should be donned with 100% oxygen to exclude fumes. Passenger oxygen may also need to be deployed.

Be prepared to carry out the unreliable speed procedure as airspeed indications may be compromised.

Disconnect the autothrust to prevent thrust variations. To minimise the impact on the engines, if conditions permit thrust should be reduced. Turn on all anti-ice and set pack flow to high in order to increase bleed demand and thus increase stall margin. Wing anti-ice should be turned off before restart in case of double engine flameout.

If engine EGT limits are exceeded, consider precautionary engine shutdown with restart once clear of volcanic ash. Engine acceleration may be very slow during restart. Since compressor and turbine blades may have been eroded, avoid sudden thrust changes.

Damage to the windshield may necessitate an autoland or landing with a sliding window open.

[QRH AEP.MISC, FCOM PRO.AEP.MISC, FCTM PRO.AEP.MISC]



[5] According to Airbus, structural damage may be suspected if there has been a “loud bang” or there is a high cabin vertical speed. When limiting descent speed due to suspected structural damage, it is IAS rather than Mach that is relevant.

[6] Prior to a 2017 update from Airbus, PM would complete a fairly lengthy list of memory items at the start of the Emergency Descent procedure. It was found that PM was more usefully employed monitoring PF’s actions, and hence most of these memory items were removed to a read and do checklist to be completed once descent had been initiated.

[7] There may be insufficient oxygen to cover the entire emergency descent profile if the oxygen masks are left set to 100%.

[8] “Sufficient runway remaining” is actually Boeing advice – Airbus offers no guidance for the case where there is insufficient runway available to stop nor to rotate at normal speeds.

[9] The ALL ENG FAIL checklist replaces the DUAL FAILURE checklist for certain airframes; this appears to be related to the modification level of the FWCs.

[10] The reasoning behind turning off the crew oxygen is an assumption on my part.

[11] The AEF vs DEF configuration difference is odd since it would seem that the airframes involved are fundamentally the same, differing only in modification level of the FWCs. A reasonable explanation is that there is not, in reality, much difference between config 2 and config 3 in the ditching or forced landing case. If hydraulics are only available from the RAT, flaps are frozen and hence config 2 and config 3 are identical. If the APU generator is available and thus the yellow electric pump is available, the flaps are available; however the ΔVREF mandated for a config 2 landing and a config 3 landing (from the QRH Inflight Performance Slats and Flaps System tables) is 10kt in both cases. Clarification has been sought from Airbus through the easyJet Technical Manager – this manual will be updated as soon as I have the information.

[12] This closes all openings below the waterline and reduce water ingress; the pressurisation must be in AUTO for this to work.

[13] The “no fuel remaining” procedure does not directly call for the fire buttons to be pushed or the agents to be discharged, but the evacuation action includes these items.

[14] The Airbus Training Study Guide was recently (mid 2017) changed to align with the FCTM.