The most pressing concern following a flap or slat problem is to select a safe initial speed that will avoid overspeeding the stuck device. To establish a conservative Vmax:
For minimum speed, the VLS displayed on the pfd is calculated from actual flap and slat position and can be trusted. If VLS is unavailable, fly Vmax − 5kt.
Unless there is an obvious reason not to (e.g. wing tip brake on, alignment fault or fault due to dual hydraulic failure), the flap lever can be recycled.
If normal operation cannot be restored, there are two major issues that must be quickly addressed:
It may be that the combination of these factors requires a prompt diversion decision.
The flap and slat systems are largely independent, so the flap lever will continue to move the slats if the flaps are locked and vice versa. In general, conf 3 should be selected for landing. There are two exceptions. If flaps are locked at >3, conf Full should be used. If both slats and flaps are locked at 0, conf 1 should be used so that the ap/fd go-around is armed.
Configurations and VREF are available from the FS+ landing module by selecting suitable f/ctl ecams. Note that the surfaces can stick at intermediate positions, which can be difficult to detect from the flap/slat position indicator if they are close to “index” positions – the difference between, for example, slats 1 and slats < 1 on the indicator can be the width of a single pixel on the display.
If a flapless and slatless landing is required, the threshold speed may be below VLS. This is necessary as the landing speeds in this configuration are very close to tyre limit speeds.
Generally, the deployment method is to select a speed 5kt below VFE NEXT, then select the next configuration as the speed reduces through VFE NEXT.2
In the case where VLS>VFE NEXT, prioritise VLS: fly VLS, select the next configuration, then track VLS as it reduces with the extension of the lift device. Use of autothrust with selected speed is generally recommended for all phases of the approach, but in this case it will need to be temporarily disconnected.
The autopilot may be used down to 500ft aal, but since it is not tuned for the abnormal configuration it must be closely monitored.
Anticipate an unusual visual picture for landing.
For the go-around, initially maintain flap/slat configuration. A speed 10kt lower than max operating speed should be flown. If it is the slats that are jammed or if the flaps are jammed at 0, conf 0 can be selected for transit to a diversion airfield. To clean up, accelerate to VMax − 10kt before selecting each new configuration. Transit should be at VMax − 10kt unless clean.
Other issues include the possible loss of the automatic operation of the center tank pumps (which is sequenced to the slats) and possible reversion to Alternate Law.
It is also worth noting that failure of the slat channels of both sfccs appears to result in the loss of characteristic speed display on both pfds. This is not mentioned in the fcom but occurs in the sim.
The upshot of this is that neither VLS nor VSW are available at all, since they are not displayed and there is no way to calculate them. This is of particular concern when trying to deploy conf 2 on the approach: conf 1 does not extend flaps, so the aircraft will still be clean, yet it must be slowed to the VFE for conf 2. It is highly likely that the stall warner will activate during this transition, and if not anticipated, the subsequent recovery will overspeed the flaps.
The solution is to brief that speed will be reduced very slowly and if the stall warning occurs the speed will be maintained whilst allowing the deployment of the flaps to recover the stall margin.
[ f/ctl flaps(slats) fault(locked), qrh aep.f/ctl,
fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
In Direct Law, deflection of the control surfaces is a linear function of deflection of the side-stick and trimming must be done manually. The controls are very sensitive at high speeds.
Use of manual thrust is recommended as power changes will result in pitch changes. Similarly, use of the speed brake will result in nose up pitch changes so it should be used with care.
Protections are unavailable, so speed is limited to 320kt/0.77M and great care must be taken when flying gpws or windshear manoeuvres.
Direct Law landings are conf 3; landing distances, in the absence of other pertinent failures, are comparable to normal conf 3 landings.
The major handling difficulty with Direct Law is the go-around. There is no compensation for the large pitch moment introduced by selecting toga power on the under-slung engines, the thrust levers are non-linear, thrust onset is laggy and non-linear and the use of the manual pitch trim wheel will be unfamiliar. Apply power smoothly and progressively and anticipate a requirement for unusual side-stick inputs.
Direct Law works with or without yaw dampers. The aircraft is always convergent in dutch roll, so use lateral control, not rudder, if dutch roll is experienced.
[ f/ctl direct law, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
In Alternate Law, pitch is as in Normal Law, but roll is as in Direct Law. Load factor protection is retained, but other protections are either replaced with static stability or are lost, depending on the nature of the failure. Stall warnings and overspeed warnings become active.
The main effects are that speed is limited to 320kt and stall warnings must be respected when carrying out egpws manoeuvres.
The autopilot may be available.
Expect Direct Law after landing gear extension (see Section 6.2), and hence increased approach speeds and landing distances due to the associated conf 3 landing.
[ f/ctl altn law, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
If a single elevator fails, the secs use the remaining elevator to provide pitch control in Alternate Law (see Section 6.3). In addition, speed brake should not be used and the autopilots are unserviceable.
If both elevators fail, the only available mechanism for pitch control is manual pitch trim, so pitch reverts to mechanical back up and roll reverts to Direct Law.
For an approach without elevators, fly a long final, initiating the descent from at least 5000ft aal. Do not try to flare using trim and do not remove power until after touchdown. From 1000ft aal, try to keep power changes to within 2% N1. In the event of a go-around, power must be applied very slowly if control is not to be lost.3
[ f/ctl l(r)(l+r) elev fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
Manual pitch trim is a mechanical connection to the stabilizer actuator. It may be possible to use manual pitch trim when the elacs have detected a stabilizer jam, although it may be heavier than normal. If it is usable, trim for neutral elevators.
The flight controls will revert to Alternate Law. If the stabilizer could not be moved, gear extension should be delayed until conf 3 and VAPP are achieved so that the elevators are properly trimmed.
If the jam is caused by the mechanical connection, it is possible that the elacs will not detect the problem. The procedure in this case is similar, but Normal Law will remain.
[ f/ctl stabilizer jam, qrh aep.f/ctl, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
The lateral aircraft handling is not adversely affected even if both ailerons fail, as the systems compensate by using the spoilers. Fuel consumption will, however, increase by approximately 6%.
[ f/ctl l(r) ail fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
The effect of a spoiler fault depends on whether the spoiler fails retracted or extended.
If the spoiler fails in the retracted position, handling should not be adversely affected. A conf 3 landing may reduce any buffeting that is encountered. Speed brake should not be used if spoilers 3 and 4 are affected. The loss of ground spoilers will significantly increase landing distances.
Airbus have identified a failure scenario that leads to high pressure hydraulic fluid reaching the extend chamber of a spoiler actuator via a failed o-ring. This has the effect of a spoiler failing in the fully extended position.
In this case, the autopilot does not necessarily have sufficient authority to control the aircraft, and it should be disconnected. Fuel burn will increase significantly; fmgc fuel predictions do not account for the failure and should be disregarded. Green dot speed will minimize this increased fuel burn, but may not be viable if there is excessive buffet – attempt to find a compromise speed. Landing will be conf 3; VAPP is available from the landing module of FS+ by selecting splr fault – spoiler runaway suspected.
[ f/ctl (gnd) splr (1+2)(3+4) fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
The main indication of jammed rudder is undue and adverse pedal movement during rolling manoeuvres caused by the yaw damper orders being fed back to the pedals when they are no longer sent to the rudder.
Crosswinds from the side that the rudder is deflected should be avoided, and a cross wind limit of 15kt applies. Control on the ground will require differential braking until the steering handle can be used (below 70kt), so landing distances are increased. Do not use autobrake.
[ f/ctl rudder jam, qrh aep.f/ctl, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
In normal operations, elac1 controls the ailerons and elac2 controls the elevators and stabiliser. Failure of a single elac will result in failover to the remaining computer. Provided no uncommanded manoeuvres occurred, an attempt can be made to reset the failed elac.
Failure of both elacs leads to loss of ailerons and hence Alternate Law. One of the secs will take over control of the elevators and stabiliser. Again, an attempt can be made to reset the computers.
If the fault is designated a pitch fault, only the pitch function of the associated elac is lost.
[ f/ctl elac 1(2) fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
Each sec controls either 1 or 2 spoilers per wing. sec1 and sec2 also provide back up for the elacs (see Section 6.9). Loss of a sec leads to loss of its associated spoilers. sec1 provides spoiler position to the facs. If speedbrakes are deployed with sec1 failed and sec3 operative, spoiler 2 will deploy without a corresponding increase in VLS. Therefore, do not use speedbrake if sec1 is affected.
Pairs of secs also provide the signal for reverse thrust lever angle to the reversers and spoiler deployment to the autobrake. A dual sec failure will therefore lead to a loss of a reverser and loss of autobraking.
If all secs are lost, in addition to the above, the controls revert to Alternate Law. Due to the normal routing of data from the lgcius to the elacs being via the secs, Direct Law will occur at selection of conf 2 rather than at gear extension.4
An attempt should be made to reset the affected sec(s).
[ f/ctl sec 1(2)(3) fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
Each sfcc has fully independent slat and flap channels. A failure of a channel in a single controller will lead to slow operation of the associated surfaces, although this is barely discernible in practice. In addition, the flap channel of sfcc1 provides input to the idle control part of the fadecs and to the egpws.
Failure of both flap channels or failure of both slat channels is covered in Section 6.1.
[ f/ctl flap(slat) sys 1(2) fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
The two fcdcs are redundant, so a single failure has no immediate effect.
If both fcdcs fail, the elacs and secs can no longer supply data to the eis. The major effect of this is that f/ctl ecam warnings are no longer generated. The warning lights on the overhead panel continue to give valid information and should be monitored.
The aircraft remains in Normal Law with all protections, but protection indications (bank and pitch limits, Vα-prot and Vα-max) are not shown and the stall warning system becomes active.
[ f/ctl fcdc 1(2)(1+2) fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
The wingtip brakes activate in case of asymmetry, mechanism overspeed, symmetrical runaway or uncommanded movements. This protection is lost.
[ f/ctl flap(slat) tip brk fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
The flap attach sensor detects excessive differential movement between the inner and outer flaps which would indicate failure of a flap attachment. This protection is lost.
[ f/ctl flap attach sensor, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
All flight controls have redundant servos. In the case of an elevator servo fault, a restriction to not use speedbrake above VMO/MMO applies.
[ f/ctl ail(elev) servo fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
This indicates that the spoiler positions do not correspond with the speedbrake lever position. This may be as a result of automatic retraction (α-floor activation or speed brakes deployed when conf Full selected) or as a result of spoiler malfunction. In both cases retract the speedbrake lever and in the case of spoiler malfunction consider the speedbrakes unserviceable.
[ f/ctl spd brk disagree, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
This indicates a failure of the speedbrake lever transducers rather than a problem with the spoilers. Ground spoiler activation may be expected on selection of reverse, so, providing reversers are used, landing distances should not be affected.
[ f/ctl spd brk (2)(3+4) fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
This may affect both sidesticks at the same time, but not the rudder pedals or it may affect the rudder pedals and one sidestick. Control forces will remain moderate and the aircraft remains responsive. Confirm autopilot disengagement and consider transferring control if one of the sidesticks is unaffected.
[ qrh aep.f/ctl, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
It is possible for a failed sidestick transducer to cause uncommanded control inputs. If no fault is detected, the result is that the aircraft behaves as if that input had actually been made. The autopilot will disconnect and any attempt to control the aircraft with the failed sidestick will fail.
The aircraft should be recovered with the other sidestick using the takeover button. Keeping this button pressed for 40 seconds will lock out the failed sidestick, and the autopilot can then be re-engaged. The autopilot should not be disconnected in the normal manner as pressing either takeover button will re-introduce the failed sidestick and the uncommanded input; use the FCU instead.
1The Vmax displayed on the pfd is a function of flap lever position. Conversely, the ecam overspeed warning is a function of actual flap and slat positions.
2VFE NEXT is a function of flap lever position, so it takes no account of the failure. Since it is likely that for any given configuration there are fewer high lift surfaces than normal deployed, the next configuration is selected as soon as possible, even at the risk of turbulence causing a slight overspeed. If VFE NEXT is not available, placarded speeds can be used instead.
3This is Boeing advice – Airbus does not provide guidance for the flare or go-around technique when elevators are frozen.
4The autopilot is available with loss of all secs. If the autopilot is engaged when conf 2 is selected, Alternate Law will be retained; the reversion to Direct Law will occur at autopilot disconnection.