The decision to reject rests solely with cm1. This decision is communicated with the words “Stop” or “Go”. “Stop” implies that cm1 is taking control of the aircraft.
Below 100kt the rto is relatively risk free and a decision to stop should be made for any ecam and most other problems.
Above 100kt the rto may be hazardous and stopping should only be considered for loss of engine thrust, any ﬁre warning, any uninhibited ecam1, or anything which indicates the aircraft will be unsafe or unable to ﬂy.
If a stop is required, cm1 calls “Stop” while simultaneously bringing the thrust levers to idle, then to max reverse.
If the stop was commenced below 72kt the ground spoilers will not automatically deploy and the autobrake will therefore not engage. Monitor automatic braking, and if there is any doubt, apply manual braking as required. If normal braking fails, announce “Loss of braking” and proceed with the loss of braking memory items (see Section 9.1).
If the reason for the stop was an engine ﬁre on the upwind side, consider turning the aircraft to keep the ﬁre away from the fuselage.
If there is any chance of requiring evacuation, bring the aircraft to a complete halt, stow the reversers, apply the parking brake, and order “Attention, crew at stations” on the pa.
If evacuation will deﬁnitely not be required, once the aircraft’s safety is assured the rto can be discontinued and the runway cleared. In this case make a pa of “Cabin crew, normal operations”.
During this initial phase, cm2 conﬁrms reverser deployment (“Reverse green”), conﬁrms deceleration (“Decel”), cancels any audio warnings, informs atc and announces “70 knots” when appropriate. cm2 then locates the emergency evacuation checklist.
Once the aircraft has stopped, cm1 takes the radios and asks cm2 to carry out any required ecam actions. Whilst the ecam actions are being completed, cm1 will build up a decision as to whether to evacuate. If an evacuation is required, see Section 2.4. Otherwise order “Cabin crew, normal operations”.
If the aircraft has come to a complete halt using autobrake max, the brakes can be released by disarming the spoilers.
If, following an rto, a new takeoﬀ is to be attempted, reset both fds, set the fcu, then restart sops from the After Start checklist. Carefully consider brake temperatures; temperature indications continue to climb for some time after a signiﬁcant braking event.
[ eomb 3.10, fctm pro.aep.misc ]
Apply rudder conventionally to maintain runway track. At Vr rotate at a slightly reduced rate towards an initial pitch target of 12½° then target speed V2 to V2+15kt. Bank angle should be limited to 15° when more than 3kt below manoeuvring speed for the current conﬁguration.2
When the ground to ﬂight mode transition is complete,3 select toga.4 Adjust and trim rudder to maintain β target; this will result in a small side-slip angle towards the failed engine. Engage the autopilot once gear is up and rudder is trimmed.
Handling of failures that occur on the takeoﬀ roll or at very low level is primarily a test of triage skills. Airbus provides support in three ways:
Whilst below 400ft, then, the focus should be on ﬂying and monitoring, with heightened awareness of the possibility of missing essential normal actions, such as calling rotate or raising the gear due to the distraction of the failure. It may help pf assimilate the challenges of the ﬂying task if pm states the title of the ﬁrst displayed ecam procedure, but no action to diagnose or contain the failure should be taken. A very quick and well timed “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, standby” and “Attention Crew at Stations” from pm may also be useful to forestall external interruptions. When and if possible, the autopilot should be engaged to reduce workload.
An extremely useful tool for dealing with low level failures is the eosid, as described in Section 1.4. While the name suggests that this is only to be used with engine failures, in reality it is a pre-planned safe ﬂight path that may be ﬂown whenever there is doubt that available aircraft performance is suﬃcient to ﬂy the cleared sid or go-around. Since both pilots should already be aware of the details of the eosid, pm can simply declare their intention to ﬂy it to generate a shared mental model. Note that ﬂying an eosid is higher workload than ﬂying the planned sid in nav or ﬂying visually; it is an option, not a requirement.
Another useful tool, often used in association with the eosid, is the concept of “high priority tasks”. These are deﬁned as:
These deﬁnitions help with the triage process, allowing standardised interleaving of the diagnosis and containment of the failure with the ﬂying and monitoring tasks. In particular, the level acceleration phase of the eosid is generally delayed until these tasks are completed, with the phrase “engine is secure” a de facto standard call to indicate that pf might like to consider interrupting the containment process.6 Unfortunately, they are only deﬁned for engine failures and ﬁres, so with other failures, the crew will have to make a judgement call as to what constitutes “high priority”.
[ fctm pro.aep.eng ]
Before the divergence point (the last common point between the sid and the eosid), if the aircraft detects a loss of thrust the eosid will be displayed as a temporary ﬂight plan. In this case the temporary ﬂight plan can be inserted and nav mode used. Otherwise it will be necessary to pull heading and manually follow either the yellow line or bring up a pre-prepared secondary ﬂight plan and follow the white line.
If beyond the divergence point, pull heading and make an immediate turn the shortest way onto the eosid. Airbus speciﬁcally recommends against this (fcom as.22.20.60), but easyJet states it as policy (eomb 4.4.4).
Electing to ﬂy the eosid implies a level acceleration segment:
toga may be used for a maximum of 10 minutes.
If an eosid is annotated as “std”, then acceleration to green dot should be completed prior to commencing the ﬁrst turn. If “non-std”, the turn takes priority.
[ eomb 4.4.4, fcom dsc.22_20.60.40 ]
1There are ﬁve uninhibited amber ecam cautions that require a high speed rto. Only two uninhibited ecams are not on this list: eng 1(2) thr lever disagree if the fadec automatically selects idle thrust and fws fwc 1+2 fault. The ﬁrst of these should never happen due to fadec logic. The second generates a message on the ewd but no master caution (it is the computers that generate master cautions that have failed). You could therefore modify this rule to: stop for any ecam warning or caution except the caution-like fws fwc 1+2 fault.
2This is a conservative rule of thumb. If the fmgc has correctly identiﬁed an engine out condition, the fd/ap will automatically limit bank angle according to a less conservative algorithm (see fcom sys.22.214.171.124)
3Introducing toga during the ground to ﬂight mode transition (commences as the pitch increases through 8°, complete after 5 seconds) results in a pitch up moment at a time where the eﬀect of stick pitch control is not wholly predictable: the stick will need to be moved forward of neutral to counteract the introduced pitch moment and then returned to neutral as ﬂight mode blends in. A slight pause before selecting toga results in much more normal and predictable handling.
4flx may be used but this tends to allow speed to decay unless pitch is reduced
5…although it does go on to water this statement down by saying that, for some unspeciﬁed emergency situations, the 400ft part of the recommendation may be disregarded
6The phrases “Stop ecam” and “Continue ecam” are standard for interrupting containment.